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Abstract
Reversion and spread of vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) to cause outbreaks of poliomy-
elitis is a rare outcome resulting from immunisation with the live-attenuated oral poliovirus
vaccines (OPVs). Global withdrawal of all three OPV serotypes is therefore a key objective
of the polio endgame strategic plan, starting with serotype 2 (OPV2) in April 2016. Supple-
mentary immunisation activities (SIAs) with trivalent OPV (tOPV) in advance of this date
could mitigate the risks of OPV2 withdrawal by increasing serotype-2 immunity, but may
also create new serotype-2 VDPV (VDPV2). Here, we examine the risk factors for VDPV2
emergence and implications for the strategy of tOPV SIAs prior to OPV2 withdrawal. We
first developed mathematical models of VDPV2 emergence and spread. We found that in
settings with low routine immunisation coverage, the implementation of a single SIA
increases the risk of VDPV2 emergence. If routine coverage is 20%, at least 3 SIAs are
needed to bring that risk close to zero, and if SIA coverage is low or there are persistently
“missed” groups, the risk remains high despite the implementation of multiple SIAs. We
then analysed data from Nigeria on the 29 VDPV2 emergences that occurred during 2004
−2014. Districts reporting the first case of poliomyelitis associated with a VDPV2 emer-
gence were compared to districts with no VDPV2 emergence in the same 6-month period
using conditional logistic regression. In agreement with the model results, the odds of
VDPV2 emergence decreased with higher routine immunisation coverage (odds ratio 0.67
for a 10% absolute increase in coverage [95% confidence interval 0.55−0.82]). We also
found that the probability of a VDPV2 emergence resulting in poliomyelitis in >1 child was
significantly higher in districts with low serotype-2 population immunity. Our results support
a strategy of focused tOPV SIAs before OPV2 withdrawal in areas at risk of VDPV2 emer-
gence and in sufficient number to raise population immunity above the threshold permitting
VDPV2 circulation. A failure to implement this risk-based approach could mean these SIAs
actually increase the risk of VDPV2 emergence and spread.
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Author Summary
Global, coordinated withdrawal of serotype-2 OPV (OPV2) is planned for April 2016 and
will mark a major milestone for the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Because
OPV2 withdrawal will leave cohorts of young children susceptible to serotype-2 poliovirus,
minimising the risk of new serotype-2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) emergences
before and after OPV2 withdrawal is crucial to avoid large outbreaks. Supplementary
immunisation activities (SIAs) with trivalent OPV (tOPV) could raise serotype-2 immu-
nity in advance of OPV2 withdrawal, but may also create new VDPV2. To guide the GPEI
strategy we examined the risks and benefits of implementing tOPV SIAs using mathemati-
cal models and analysis of data on the 29 independent VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria dur-
ing 2004–2014. We found that in settings with low routine immunisation coverage, the
implementation of a small number of tOPV SIAs could in fact increase the probability of
VDPV2 emergence. This probability is greater if SIA coverage is poor or if there are persis-
tently unvaccinated groups within the population. A strategy of tOPV SIA in sufficient
number and with high coverage to achieve high population immunity in geographically-
focused, at-risk areas is needed to reduce the global risk of VDPV2 emergence after OPV2
withdrawal.
Introduction
Global and synchronous withdrawal of all live-attenuated oral poliovirus vaccines (OPV) is
one of the major objectives of the global Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–
2018 [1] and part of the global transition from OPV to inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV).
Serotype 2 will be the first to be removed, with a planned date of April 2016. This means that
trivalent OPV (tOPV) will be replaced by bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing Sabin virus types 1
and 3) in routine immunisation programmes, and tOPV will no longer be used in supplemen-
tary immunisation activities (SIAs). Furthermore, all OPV-using countries are recommended
to introduce at least one dose of IPV in their routine immunisation programmes before the
switch from tOPV to bOPV [2].
OPV use needs to be stopped because of its genetic instability. Attenuated vaccine (Sabin)
polioviruses lose key genetic determinants of attenuation through mutation and/or recombina-
tion with other enterovirus serotypes during replication in the human gut [3]. In countries
using OPV, approximately 1 child per 900,000 first OPV doses is estimated to develop vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) [4]. The relative contributions of viral evolution
(loss of key attenuating sites), immune function of the vaccine recipient and chance in the aeti-
ology of VAPP are unclear. More significantly for the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
(GPEI), vaccine polioviruses may spread from the recipient to his or her contacts, in rare cases
leading to an outbreak of a vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV). VDPVs are defined as OPV-
related isolates whose ~900-nucleotide sequence encoding the major capsid protein VP1 differs
from that of the parental strain by>1% for serotypes 1 and 3, and>0.6% for serotype 2 [5].
VDPVs are classified into three categories: circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs), when there is evi-
dence of person-to-person transmission; immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs),
shed by individuals with primary immunodeficiencies who have prolonged, sometimes
chronic, virus excretion; and, ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs), which are isolates that cannot be
classified as cVDPV or iVDPV despite thorough investigation [6,7]. Until July 2015, the defini-
tion of cVDPV required that genetically linked VDPVs were isolated from at least two AFP
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cases, but the GPEI now considers even single individual or environmental sample isolates to
be cVDPV if their genetic features indicate prolonged circulation [7].
cVDPVs have transmission dynamics similar to wild polioviruses [8]. Since 2006, more
than 680 acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases due to VDPVs have been reported worldwide [9],
underlining the importance of VDPVs for the polio eradication endgame. Strikingly,>97% of
those cases have been associated with serotype 2 [9], whose wild counterpart was last detected
in 1999 [10]. The burden of serotype 2 VDPV (VDPV2) and the eradication of serotype 2 wild
poliovirus (WPV2) in 1999 are the main motivations for the global withdrawal of serotype 2
OPV (OPV2) planned for April 2016.
Polioviruses spread where levels of immunity in the population are low and where environ-
mental conditions such as sanitation and crowding facilitate virus transmission. As such, the
detection of cVDPVs has historically been associated with poor population immunity [3,8,11–
15]. However, the initial appearance of a VDPV in a population depends on different factors
and the relationship with population immunity may be more complex. For example, the num-
ber of people infected with Sabin poliovirus, the duration of excretion among those infected,
the extent of secondary transmission and the prevalence of other enteroviruses may all be
important in determining the probability of VDPV emergence.
Worldwide OPV2 withdrawal will put the 155 countries currently using tOPV in their rou-
tine immunisation programmes at risk of outbreaks of VDPV2 given the associated increase in
the number of children susceptible to that type. SIAs with tOPV prior to OPV2 withdrawal
would increase population immunity to serotype 2 and have been proposed as a strategy to
mitigate the risk of VDPV2 emergence and spread [16]. However, infrequent or poor-coverage
SIAs could lead to limited immunity and potentially an adverse increase in risk resulting from
poliovirus shedding and seeding of new VDPV. A better understanding of the factors associ-
ated with the risk of VDPV emergence and subsequent spread will help the GPEI to define a
clear strategy on the number, timing and geographic extent of any tOPV SIA that minimises
the risk of VDPV2 emergence at the time of and immediately after OPV2 withdrawal. Defining
such a strategy is one of the priorities of the polio eradication program.
In this article, we first present mathematical models that describe the relationship between
the coverage of routine and supplementary immunisation activities, and the probability of
VDPV emergence and subsequent spread. To test the conclusions from the mathematical mod-
els, we then identified risk factors associated with past VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria. For this
aim, we carried out a case-control analysis of those districts reporting the first case of poliomy-
elitis associated with each of the 29 independent VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria during 2004
−2014 compared with districts without emergences. We also used logistic regression to identify
the risk factors associated with the probability that a VDPV2 emergence resulted in>1 case of
poliomyelitis. We finish by discussing the implications of our findings for the tOPV SIA strat-
egy to reduce the risk of VDPV2 emergence during and post OPV2 withdrawal.
Materials and Methods
Mathematical models
The number of people infected with Sabin polioviruses is primarily determined by the number
of doses of OPV administered during routine and supplementary immunisation activities and
the level of population immunity. As the amount of OPV administered increases from zero,
the number of Sabin-infected individuals will initially increase, but at some point further
increases in OPV administration are likely to result in a decrease in the number of individuals
infected because of the associated increase in the level of population immunity. This implies a
trade-off in the levels of OPV use that will favour VDPV emergence. We developed two
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mathematical models to study this trade-off: an analytical model that includes only SIAs, and a
more complex model that includes both routine immunisation and SIAs, which must be solved
through numerical simulation. We used these models to investigate the risks and benefits of
carrying out preventive campaigns with tOPV as a strategy to maximise population immunity
to serotype 2 prior to OPV2 withdrawal.
Analytical model: SIAs only. We assume that a proportion of the population s0 is suscep-
tible at the time that SIAs commence. We also assume that the SIAs occur at least 4 weeks
apart but in sufficiently close succession such that we can ignore births and deaths during the
period of analysis. Under these assumptions the expected proportion of children shedding vac-
cine poliovirus after a single SIA i1 can be written
i1 ¼ y11 þ y12 ð1Þ
where y11 is the proportion shedding as a result of direct administration of OPV during the SIA
and y12 the proportion shedding as a result of secondary spread of OPV from that SIA (i.e. y
1
1
and y12 differ on the source from which the infection is acquired, the vaccine or a Sabin-infected
individual). We denote the coverage of the campaign by v, vaccine “take” by w, and the basic
reproduction number of Sabin polioviruses by R0S. We assume all individuals who shed polio-
virus following vaccine “take” are subsequently immune to reinfection and do not thereafter
participate in poliovirus transmission. The expected proportion of children shedding following
direct administration of OPV is then given by
y11 ¼ s0vw ð2Þ
assuming in this simple model that immunised individuals cannot be reinfected with OPV.
The expected proportion of children who subsequently shed as a result of secondary transmis-
sion of OPV under a simple SIR model satisﬁes
y12 ¼ ðs0  y11Þ 1 expðR0Sðy11 þ y12ÞÞ
  ð3Þ
following Bailey 1975 [17], where s0  y11 is the proportion of children susceptible to infection.
Note that secondary spread of OPV includes second, third and subsequent generation spread,
and not only transmission from a vaccinated individual.
Following this SIA, the proportion of the population that is susceptible is reduced by i1 such
that the fraction susceptible becomes s1 = s0−i1. We assume that all secondary transmission has
finished before the next SIA. This is a reasonable assumption if R0S< 1 because the majority of
secondary transmission will take place in under 4 weeks (Section A.1.1 in S1 Text).
Subsequent SIAs are assumed to reach the same proportion v of the population (i.e. same
coverage), which may either consist of randomly chosen individuals at each round (random
coverage) or repeatedly reach the same fixed group of individuals (fixed coverage), meaning
there is a persistently “missed” group. Each of the subsequent n SIAs will result in the propor-
tions i2,i3,. . .,in of individuals shedding Sabin poliovirus, and s2,s3,. . .,sn susceptible (see Section
A.1.2 in S1 Text for modelling details under the two types of SIA coverage, random and fixed).
The number r of emergent VDPVs following the n SIAs can be considered a function of the
number of individuals infected with Sabin poliovirus. The probability of Sabin reversion to
VDPV may differ by whether the infection is primary or secondarily transmitted. In the sim-
plest case, we assume all Sabin infections have the same, very small probability of reverting to a
VDPV. In this case, the number of emergent VDPVs is given by
r ’ rN
Xn
k¼1
ik ð4Þ
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where N is the total population size and ρ is an unknown parameter that determines the abso-
lute risk of VDPV emergence (i.e. reversion of a Sabin virus). The latter is assumed to capture
unknown risk factors such as the prevalence of other enterovirus serotypes that could act as
partners for recombination and the prevalence of primary immunodeﬁciencies that might
result in prolonged excretion of vaccine poliovirus. Because the number of emergent VDPVs
depends on ρ and N via their product, we can reparameterize r by introducing the parameter
σ = ρN:
r ’ s
Xn
k¼1
ik ð5Þ
The probability that an emergent VDPV spreads and produces one or more AFP cases will
depend on the size of the resulting outbreak. The cVDPVs characterised so far appear to show
similar attack rates to wild poliovirus [8,12] and are therefore likely to have a reproduction
number R0V sufficient to result in a significant outbreak unless population immunity levels are
high. The probability of an outbreak of VDPV for a simple epidemic model is given by q = max
(1−1/(R0Vs),0), where s is the proportion of the population susceptible to infection. For a major
outbreak, the duration of transmission will significantly exceed 4 weeks (unlike Sabin virus)
and therefore we make the assumption that s sn, i.e. population susceptibility is defined at
the end of all n SIAs. Assuming the overall risk of emergence is relatively small, this means that
the number of emergent VDPVs that will produce an outbreak will be approximately Poisson
distributed with mean proportional to rq. The probability of (at least) one outbreak of VDPV
occurring is therefore given by
PðVDPV outbreakÞ ¼ 1 expðrqÞ ð6Þ
and the expected proportion of individuals that have been infected with a VDPV once the out-
break has ﬁnished can be obtained using the equation for y12 and replacing R0S by R0V, s0  y11
by sn and y11 by r
Xn
k¼1
ik. Fig A in S1 Text illustrates the processes captured by this model.
We use this model to explore how the probability of a VDPV outbreak changes for different
number of SIAs and different SIA coverage in a scenario without routine immunisation.
The model of Sabin virus spread during the n SIAs described above can be reformulated
(Section A.2.1 in S1 Text) and using this equivalent version, some system’s properties can be
studied analytically, leading to a more general understanding of the model’s behaviour. Very
briefly, we show that multiple rounds of SIAs with the same coverage v are equivalent (in terms
of the proportion of individuals infected with Sabin at some point and the proportion who
remains susceptible after the SIAs) to a single round of SIA with vaccine coverage given as a
certain function of v, w and n. For interested readers, the equivalent version of the model and
the analytical results that can be obtained are given in Section A.2 in S1 Text.
Stochastic compartmental model: routine immunisation and SIAs. We wish to study
the risk of VDPV emergence and spread in the context of OPV withdrawal. It is thus necessary
to extend our previous conceptual framework to include routine immunisation. In order to
include both routine and supplementary immunisation, we constructed a stochastic compart-
mental model of Sabin virus and VDPV spread that also considers births and deaths.
If a fixed proportion of individuals vri is reached by routine immunisation at each scheduled
dose, and three doses of OPV are given, then assuming that only a fraction w of those doses
will “take”, the proportion c of children who received the three doses and shed Sabin virus is
c = vriw(1+(1−w)+(1−w)
2). We model secondary spread of OPV through an SIR model with
demography where the proportion c of children vaccinated and shedding the virus enter the
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model as infected with Sabin poliovirus, and the other children enter the model as susceptible.
As before, a small proportion ρ of incident Sabin poliovirus infections are assumed to revert to
VDPV, which may then spread in the population. In this simple case, we assume that this pro-
portion is fixed and independent of whether infection was acquired directly through immuni-
sation or through secondary spread of OPV. See Section A.3 in S1 Text for the full model
description. As for the analytical model above, two versions of the stochastic model were
implemented: one where each SIA reaches a fixed proportion of the population consisting of
randomly chosen individuals at each round (random coverage, Table A in S1 Text), and one
where the same individuals are reached at each SIA, thus leaving a persistently “missed” group
(fixed coverage, Table B in S1 Text).
We used the model to explore how the risk of VDPV2 emergence and spread varies depend-
ing on tOPV use in a context of OPV2 withdrawal and considering a population of 10,000 indi-
viduals. We simulated the model from a VDPV2-free initial equilibrium for 1 year under
different scenarios that included different levels of routine immunisation coverage and between
0 and 5 SIAs (Fig 1). Routine immunisation with tOPV was assumed to stop at 6 months and
the last tOPV SIA 4 weeks before this date corresponding to plans for SIAs with tOPV before
OPV2 withdrawal. We defined the risk of a VDPV2 outbreak after OPV2 withdrawal as the
Fig 1. Illustration of results from the stochastic dynamic mathematical model of VDPV2 emergence and spread. The
model is simulated for 1 year and a population of 10,000 individuals, starting from a VDPV-free equilibrium that includes routine
immunisation. OPV2 withdrawal occurs at 6 months (red arrow) and the last tOPV SIA is assumed to occur 4 weeks before this
date in agreement with current plans. SIAs are implemented 4 weeks apart. We define the risk of a VDPV2 outbreak after OPV2
withdrawal as the probability of having >200 incident VDPV2 infections during the 6 months following OPV2 cessation. In this
illustration, the grey lines represent the number of VDPV infected individuals over time for 20 different simulations of the model
assuming 20% routine immunisation coverage and 3 tOPV SIAs with 80% coverage implemented before OPV2 withdrawal.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.g001
Preventing VDPV Emergence
PLOS Pathogens | DOI:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728 July 6, 2016 6 / 18
probability of having>200 incident VDPV2 infections during the 6 months following OPV2
withdrawal (robustness of this threshold for increasing population size is explored, Fig F in S1
Text). This corresponds to a probability of approximately 20% of observing a case of poliomy-
elitis, given a case-to-infection ratio for serotype 2 of approximately 1:800 (based on data indi-
cating 4–5 times lower pathogenicity for this serotype compared with serotype 1 [18], which
has a case-to-infection ratio of about 1:150 [19,20]). We performed 500 simulations for each
scenario and present the proportion of simulations that resulted in this outcome.
Parameter values. For both models (the SIA-analytical and the stochastic dynamic), the
probability of vaccine “take” was set at w = 0.55 [21] and the reproduction number of Sabin
virus was assumed to be<1 and fixed to R0S = 0.5. The reproduction number of VDPVs was
set at R0V = 5, similar to estimated values for wild poliovirus [22]. Finally, the probability of
Sabin virus reversion to VDPVs was set at ρ = 5×10−4, although we explored sensitivity of our
results to this value.
Risk factors for VDPV2 emergence and spread in Nigeria (2004−2014)
Data. Multiple emergences of VDPV2 were identified in Nigeria during 2004−2014 on the
basis of detection of virus in stool collected from children with AFP and phylogenetic analysis
of the P1/capsid region [15,23]. We recorded the district of residence and date of onset of
paralysis for the first case of AFP associated with each of these independent emergences.
We created a database for all the districts of Nigeria for the period 2004−2014 that included
variables describing routine immunisation coverage, serotype-2 population immunity, the
number of tOPV SIAs in the preceding 6 months (since VDPV2 emergence will precede detec-
tion in a child with AFP by about this time period, based on observed genetic divergence from
the Sabin virus [23,24]), and demographic variables including mean household size, population
density and annual number of births (Section B in S1 Text). We compiled the data for 6-month
periods, defined as April-September and October-March (roughly corresponding with a high-
transmission period during spring-summer months and a low-transmission period in autumn-
winter months). This resulted in 772x19 = 14,668 district 6-month observations (from April
2004 to September 2014). Serotype-2 population immunity was estimated among children 0–2
years old based on the vaccination histories of children with non-polio AFP and the SIA calen-
dar (Section C in S1 Text). Routine immunisation coverage was estimated interpolating data
across the whole country for three doses of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP3) vaccination
from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) [25] clusters (Section D in S1 Text).
Statistical analyses. We used a “case-control” approach to compare districts in a given
6-month period where VDPV2 emergences occurred with districts in a given 6-month period
where there were no VDPV2 emergences. In this framework, a “case” was defined as a district
over a 6-month period (district−6-months) where the first AFP case associated with a VDPV2
emergence was detected. A “control” was defined as a district−6-months with no VDPV2
emergences. Each district−6-months case was matched to 20 district−6-months controls from
the same 6-month period to allow for potential confounding as a result of secular trends. The
controls were randomly selected among all the district−6-months candidates that satisfied the
matching criteria (i.e. same 6-month period).
We performed univariable and multivariable analyses using conditional logistic regression
models. Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated for all explana-
tory variables and associations with P values<0.05 were considered to be statistically signifi-
cant. All variables with Wald test P<0.05 in univariable analyses were included in the
multivariable models and the final multivariable model was the one with the lowest AIC [26].
All the analyses were performed using the “survival” package [27] from R [28].
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Finally, we also used univariable logistic regression analyses to test whether any of the vari-
ables were associated with the probability that a VDPV2 emergence resulted in>1 case of
poliomyelitis (i.e. established a circulating lineage), thus corresponding to the definition of
cVDPV used until July 2015, which required that genetically linked VDPVs were isolated from
at least two AFP cases.
Results
Mathematical models
We explored the probability of a VDPV outbreak for different numbers of supplementary cam-
paigns in a scenario without routine immunisation and considering a population completely
susceptible (Fig 2). Using the analytical model, if the individuals reached at each campaign are
randomly chosen (assuming the same coverage at each campaign), the risk of a VDPV out-
break is maximised at low and intermediate levels of SIA coverage (Fig 2A). The exact location
of the peak in risk depends on the number of SIAs, rapidly shifting to lower values of SIA cov-
erage for increasing number of SIAs. In particular, for a single SIA with 100% coverage, the
probability of a VDPV outbreak is around 70%, which is explained by the relatively small pro-
portion of children that will be protected after the campaign, due to the limited (~50%) immu-
nogenicity of OPV. As expected, the size of any resulting outbreak is also significantly smaller
for increasing number of SIAs (Fig 2D). Although the absolute risk of VDPV emergence
depends on the assumed probability of reversion of Sabin poliovirus to a VDPV (ρ) and the
assumed population size (N) via σ = ρN, the location of the peak in risk does not change unless
the value of σ is so low or high as to make VDPV emergence impossible or inevitable respec-
tively. We provide a sensitivity analysis of the probability of VDPV outbreak to the value of σ
in Fig B in S1 Text. In particular, when σ becomes sufficiently large, the probability of a VDPV
outbreak becomes a stepwise function of SIA coverage (Fig B in S1 Text).
If the same individuals are reached at each campaign, thus leaving a “missed” group that is
only immunised through secondary spread of Sabin virus, the risk of a VDPV outbreak is max-
imised at intermediate levels of SIA coverage. More importantly, increasing the number of
SIAs above 4 barely reduces the risk, which becomes zero only above 70% coverage after 4 or
more SIAs (Fig 2B). In other words, there is a threshold in SIA coverage under which the risk
does not decrease despite increasing the number of campaigns. The existence of this threshold
can be shown analytically (Section A.2.3 in S1 Text), and for both random and fixed coverage,
an expression for the minimum SIA vaccine coverage required to have zero probability of
outbreak can be found (Section A.2.3 in S1 Text). A sensitivity analysis of the minimum SIA
coverage required for zero probability of a VDPV outbreak to a broad range of values of the
reproduction number of Sabin virus and the reproduction number of VDPVs is shown in Figs
D and E in S1 Text. As expected, the minimum SIA coverage to bring the probability of a
VDPV outbreak to zero increases for increasing values of the reproduction number of VDPVs,
however, it slightly decreases for increasing values of the reproduction number of Sabin virus,
because of the associated increase in the number of individuals who will be immunised by sec-
ondary spread of OPV from vaccinees.
The risk of observing an outbreak of VDPV obtained with the more complex model in the
absence of routine immunisation coverage displays a shape similar to that obtained with the
analytical model, although stochastic extinction results in a lower risk at low values of SIA cov-
erage (Fig 2C).
The stochastic SIR model allows the study of the risk of VDPV2 outbreak in the context of
OPV2 withdrawal. Including reasonable levels of routine immunisation coverage results in a
significant reduction in the risk of VDPV2 outbreaks during the 6 months that follow OPV2
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withdrawal (Fig 3A and 3B). This risk becomes almost negligible when routine coverage is high
(Fig 3B), but for low levels of routine immunisation coverage, multiple tOPV SIAs preceding
OPV2 withdrawal are needed to avoid seeding new VDPV2 (Fig 3C and 3D). Notably, in the
Fig 2. Probability of VDPV outbreak as a function of SIA coverage for scenarios with no routine immunisation. (A) Results for the analytical model
assuming that each SIA reaches the same proportion of the population consisting of randomly chosen individuals at each round (SIA random coverage). (B)
Results for the analytical model assuming that SIAs reach the same individuals at each round (SIA fixed coverage) with secondary spread of Sabin virus to
the “missed” group. (C) Results for the stochastic dynamic model assuming SIA random coverage. (D) Proportion of individuals infected with VDPV
(outbreak size) for the analytical model assuming SIA random coverage. The colours correspond to different number of SIAs. The simulations assume σ = 5,
which corresponds for example to a population of 10,000 individuals and a probability of Sabin reversion to VDPV of ρ = 5×10−4. A sensitivity analysis to the
value of σ is provided in Fig B in S1 Text.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.g002
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Fig 3. Probability of VDPV outbreak for scenarios with both routine immunisation and SIAs. Probability of a VDPV outbreak during the 6 months
following OPV withdrawal as a function of SIA coverage for the stochastic dynamic model with routine immunisation and SIA random coverage, assuming
(A) 20% and (B) 70% routine immunisation coverage. Probability of a VDPV outbreak in a setting with 20% routine immunisation coverage as a function of
the number of SIAs, assuming they reach a fixed proportion of the population at each round consisting of (C) randomly chosen individuals each time (SIA
random coverage) or (D) the same individuals each time such that there is a persistently “missed” group (SIA fixed coverage). The probabilities are based on
500 simulations of the model.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.g003
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context of low routine immunisation coverage, a single SIA seems to highly increase the risk
irrespective of SIA coverage, and at least 3 campaigns at high coverage are needed to bring that
risk close to zero (Fig 3C and 3D). If campaign coverage is only intermediate and there is a per-
sistently “missed” group (i.e. SIAs reach the same individuals at each round), the risk of
VDPV2 outbreak remains high even after 4 or 5 SIAs (Fig 3D).
Risk factors for VDPV2 emergence and spread in Nigeria (2004−2014)
A total of 29 independent VDPV2 emergence events were identified in Nigeria during the
study period, of which 7 resulted in more than one case of poliomyelitis (Fig 4A, Table C in S1
Text). This resulted in 28 cases in the case-control analysis, since two emergences took place in
the same district during the same 6-month period (Maiduguri, Borno state, between April and
September 2006). The 28 cases were matched to 560 controls.
Fig 4. Independent VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria (2004−2014). (A) Time and geographical distribution of the first AFP case associated with each of the
29 independent VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria during 2004−2014. Triangles represent isolates that established circulating lineages (>1 case of
poliomyelitis), whereas points represent single isolates. The triangles and points representing the emergence events are randomly plotted within the
corresponding districts. The colours correspond to the year of onset of paralysis. (B) Maps of the predicted DTP3 coverage by district for the 2003, 2008 and
2013 DHS. The publication of this map does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WHO concerning the legal status of any
territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.g004
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The number of tOPV SIAs in the previous 6 months varied between 0 and 5 (Fig H in S1
Text). Important changes over time occurred, due to a progressive and rapid removal of tOPV
from SIA since 2006, which was replaced by bOPV, mOPV1 and mOPV3 [29]. tOPV was re-
introduced in SIAs since mid-2009. These changes over time were also reflected in estimated
serotype-2 immunity among children 0–2 years old, which reached very low levels in 2008 and
2009, and increased again from 2010 onwards (Fig G in S1 Text). In general, serotype-2 popu-
lation immunity was higher in Southern districts. Routine immunisation coverage was also
higher in the South and increased during the study period (Fig 4B).
The annual number of births per district was highly variable, ranging from 42 children
(Bakassi, Cross River state) to 57,710 children (Alimosho, Lagos state), with a median of 7,542
(Fig I in S1 Text). Population density was also highly variable, ranging between an average of
9.37 (Teungo, Adamawa state) and 55,450 people per km2 (Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Lagos state),
with a median of 218.70 (Fig J in S1 Text). The mean number of household members per dis-
trict remained nearly constant over the study period, ranging between 3.26 and 6.31, and dis-
played a North-South gradient (Fig Q in S1 Text).
In the univariable analyses, a number of variables were associated with cases of VDPV2
emergence: (i) geographic region (North vs. South), (ii) serotype-2 population immunity, (iii)
routine immunisation coverage, (iv) number of tOPV campaigns in the previous 6 months, (v)
number of months since the last tOPV campaign, (vi) number of births, and (vii) number of
household members (Table 1). Districts in the North had an increased risk of VDPV2 emer-
gence compared to the South (odds ratio 5.52, [95% confidence interval 1.89−16.16]). This
association may well reflect the existence of a North-South gradient in Nigeria for many demo-
graphic, social and economic variables [30]. The number of births was also associated with
cases of VDPV2 emergence as it is a proxy for the size of the population exposed to OPV. Inter-
estingly, among the variables related to OPV use, increased population immunity, routine
immunisation coverage and the number of months since the last tOPV SIA were associated
with a reduced odds of VDPV2 emergence. However, the number of campaigns in the previous
6 months was associated with an increase in the odds of VDPV2 emergence (Table 1).
The best multivariable model (lowest AIC, 146.63) retained two variables statistically signifi-
cantly associated with cases of VDPV2 emergence: routine immunisation coverage and the
annual number of births (Table 1). In this model, an absolute increase of 10% in routine
Table 1. Univariable andmultivariable analyses of cases (district−6-months where the first AFP case associated with a VDPV2 emergence was
detected) vs. controls (district−6-months with no VDPV2 emergence). Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; OR, odds ratio; P, p-value. Statistically sig-
nificant p-values <0.05 are shown in boldface. Borderline significant p-values <0.1 are shown in italics.
Univariable analyses Best model (multivariable)
AIC = 146.63
Variable OR (95% CI) P OR (95% CI) P
North vs. South 5.52 (1.89,16.16) 0.002
Serotype-2 population immunitya 0.68 (0.56,0.83) <0.001
Routine immunisation coverageb 0.67 (0.55,0.82) <0.001 0.69 (0.57,0.84) <0.001
No. tOPV SIAs in the previous 6 months 2.97 (1.12,7.87) 0.028
No. months since last tOPV SIA 0.92 (0.83,1.01) 0.092
Annual No. births (log10) 13.09 (2.68,63.83) 0.001 16.81 (2.41,117.29) 0.004
Population density (log10) 0.94 (0.49,1.81) 0.858
Mean number of household members 2.99 (1.65,5.46) <0.001
a Odds ratio for a 10% absolute increase in serotype-2 population immunity.
b Odds ratio for a 10% absolute increase in routine immunisation coverage.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.t001
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immunisation coverage was estimated to reduce the odds of VDPV2 emergence by 31%. Add-
ing the number of tOPV SIAs in the previous 6 months to the best model gave a very similar
AIC (148.08), but the variable was not statistically significant (odds ratio 1.54, [95% confidence
interval 0.47−5.07]).
The seven VDPV2 emergences that established circulating lineages (>1 case of poliomyeli-
tis) occurred in districts with low to middle serotype-2 population immunity (<55%) and low
routine immunisation coverage (<20%) (Fig 5). A univariable logistic regression analysis
found that the probability of an emergent VDPV2 to establish a circulating lineage decreased
for higher serotype-2 population immunity (p = 0.051). The other variables did not show a sta-
tistically significant association with the probability of a VDPV2 to establish a circulating
lineage.
Discussion
This study presents an analysis of the risk factors associated with the emergence and spread of
VDPV, and provides a basis for strategic decisions about the optimal extent and number of
mass campaigns with OPV in advance of OPV withdrawal.
First, using two simple mathematical models, we describe a trade-off between OPV use and
the risk of VDPV emergence. Our findings indicate that immunity provided through routine
immunisation counterbalances well the risk of VDPV emergence and spread. However, we
found that in settings where routine immunisation coverage or the baseline level of population
Fig 5. Risk factors for an emergent VDPV2 to establish a circulating lineage associated with >1 case
of poliomyelitis in Nigeria. Serotype-2 population immunity and DTP3 coverage in districts in the 6-month
period when the first AFP case associated with each of the 29 independent VDPV2 emergences in Nigeria
during 2004−2014 were reported. Red triangles represent isolates that established circulating lineages,
whereas blue circles represent single isolates.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1005728.g005
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immunity is low, a small number of SIA campaigns could increase the risk of VDPV emergence
compared to no campaigns. This is partly due to the low immunogenicity of OPV that makes
necessary a certain number of SIA rounds to increase population immunity to levels that coun-
terbalance the risk of seeding new VDPV through those campaigns. For example, our model
predicted that in a setting with just 20% routine coverage with three tOPV doses (e.g. many dis-
tricts in northern Nigeria), a single OPV SIA increased the risk of VDPV outbreak irrespective
of SIA coverage (Fig 3). To bring population immunity to levels that completely counterbal-
anced the risk of VDPV outbreak, at least three rounds of supplementary campaigns at 80%
coverage were needed. If only intermediate levels of campaign coverage were attained and SIAs
persistently reached the same population leaving a persistently “missed” group, the risk of
VDPV emergence remained high even when a high number of campaigns were implemented
(Fig 3D). The existence of this threshold in SIA coverage under which the risk cannot decrease
despite an increasing number of SIA illustrates how groups of unvaccinated children may ham-
per the efforts to minimise the risk of VDPV after OPV withdrawal.
Second, we identified risk factors associated with VDPV2 emergence and subsequent spread
in Nigeria using epidemiologic, virologic and demographic data for 2004−2014. In both uni-
variable and multivariable analyses, districts reporting the first case of poliomyelitis associated
with a given VDPV2 emergence were more likely to have low routine immunisation coverage
and a higher number of births. These districts were also more likely to have had a higher num-
ber of tOPV SIA in the previous 6 months, although this association was not statistically signif-
icant in the final multivariable model. This may be a result of the small number of
observations, or a confounding between routine immunisation and tOPV campaigns, which
are used to fill the immunity gaps. Finally, we also found that VDPV2 emergences were more
likely to establish a circulating lineage and thus be responsible for more than one AFP case
when they emerged in districts with low serotype-2 population immunity. Interestingly, the
VDPV2 emergences that established a circulating lineage (7/29) occurred in districts with esti-
mated serotype-2 population immunity<55%.
The statistical analyses of data on VDPV2 emergence in Nigeria are consistent with our
transmission model results in suggesting that tOPV SIAs can in some settings increase the risk
of VDPV emergence. Past experience has also highlighted how limited use of OPV (Sabin or
other attenuated strains) either during small clinical trials (e.g. Poland [31,32]) or vaccination
programmes (e.g. Byelorussia, former USSR [33]) can lead to widespread circulation of VDPV
and outbreaks of poliomyelitis [31–33]. In Nigeria, the association that we found could be
explained either by an insufficient number of campaigns, low coverage of those campaigns (set-
tings with a higher number of campaigns may have poorer campaign coverage) or the existence
of persistently “missed” populations, leading to insufficient levels of population immunity to
avoid seeding new VDPV. Introduced in 2009 to monitor the quality of SIAs, lot quality assur-
ance sampling (LQAS) showed that SIA coverage in 65% of districts in Nigeria did not reach
60% by the end of 2009 [34], suggesting that possibly only intermediate levels of SIA coverage
were reached during the first half of the study period. Promisingly, significant improvements
in SIA coverage have been reported since [34].
There are several limitations to our analyses. Firstly, the results of the case-control analyses
were limited by the small number of emergence events in Nigeria, resulting in wide confidence
intervals for some odds ratios. However, we chose Nigeria because it has experienced the great-
est number of recorded VDPV2 emergences, with each VDPV2 undergoing detailed genetic
sequencing and molecular epidemiological analysis [23]. Secondly, we were only able to exam-
ine risk factors associated with the first reported case of poliomyelitis caused by a VDPV2,
rather than the initial emergence of the VDPV2. These VDPV2 isolates had between 6 and 17
nucleotide substitutions in the VP1 coding region, corresponding to an estimated average time
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of circulation since the initiating tOPV dose of around 9 months [23], thus leaving the possibil-
ity that the district where the first AFP case associated to a given emergence was detected did
not correspond to the district where the initiating tOPV dose was administered. Thirdly,
although our simple mathematical model is mechanistic–describing OPV transmission and
VDPV emergence–it does not attempt to capture the detailed genetic changes that result in
reversion of Sabin poliovirus to a VDPV with transmissibility and virulence equivalent to wild-
type virus [8]. Attenuating mutations in the Sabin polioviruses have been identified, but the
process of reversion and the significance of genetic changes for poliovirus transmission are not
well understood [3]. Instead, we chose to capture the process of reversion by a simple probabi-
listic process and derive results that are likely to be robust to the details of genetic reversion.
Fourth, although we considered models of immunisation that included persistently “missed”
populations, we did not explicitly consider geographic heterogeneity in coverage and risk.
Areas with poor routine immunisation coverage are also often challenging places to deliver
vaccine during mass campaigns. These heterogeneities in coverage are therefore likely to
increase the risk of VDPV2 emergence associated with tOPV SIAs, and it may be advisable to
increase the number of campaigns in areas with heterogeneous coverage to account for this
risk, as has been necessary during the eradication of wild-type polioviruses. Finally, other vari-
ables that could play a role in VDPV emergence such as hygiene behaviour, sanitation or the
prevalence of other enterovirus serotypes (which could act as partners for recombination with
Sabin viruses) were not included in the analysis of data from Nigeria, because they were not
available at the district level.
Our transmission models do not account for the introduction of 1 or more doses of IPV
into routine immunisation, which is a pre-requisite for OPV2 withdrawal [1]. Most countries
currently using OPV only will introduce a single IPV dose at 14 or 16 weeks. This is likely to
protect about 50% of vaccine recipients against poliomyelitis [35]. However, it is unclear what
impact this vaccine will have on poliovirus transmission, which may well be limited as a result
of the poor mucosal protection induced by this vaccine [36]. In particular, children born post
OPV2 cessation (thus non-exposed to live serotype-2 virus) may not benefit from the boost in
mucosal immunity induced by IPV [37,38]. Therefore, the impact of IPV on VDPV2 emer-
gence and transmission may be limited [39], leaving populations at risk of silent transmission
of poliovirus. Environmental surveillance will play a major role during the polio endgame, in
particular to detect highly divergent Sabin-2 viruses that could be silently circulating and help
to determine the extent of possible SIAs with monovalent OPV2 to control the spread of those
and avoid new VDPV2 outbreaks.
Taken together, our results have important implications for efforts to prevent the emergence
and subsequent spread of VDPVs during the polio endgame. First, they highlight the impor-
tance of enhancing routine immunisation coverage, which is already one of the main objectives
of the Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018 [1]. Second, they may help to
define a strategy for the use of tOPV in SIAs preceding the withdrawal of serotype 2 OPV that
minimises the risk of VDPV2 post OPV2 withdrawal. In settings where population immunity
is low and cVDPV2 currently absent, our findings and past experience suggest that 1 or 2
tOPV SIAs could increase the (small) risk of VDPV2 emergence compared to doing nothing.
This risk is enhanced where tOPV immunogenicity is low, SIA coverage poor or there is a per-
sistently “missed” group. Therefore, if tOPV SIAs are implemented preceding OPV2 with-
drawal then they should be of sufficient number and high coverage to achieve high serotype-2
population immunity. In the context of limited resources, these SIAs should be targeted to
countries considered at high risk of VDPV2 emergence according to the WHO risk assessment
system. Finally, given the recently demonstrated advantage of IPV compared with OPV in
terms of the boost to humoral and intestinal immunity in previously OPV-immunised children
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[37,38], IPV SIAs in high-risk areas may also be considered as part of the strategy to minimise
the risk of VDPV2 emergence during OPV2 withdrawal.
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